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NOTES
RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND THE DUTY TO WITHDRAW A BASELESS
PLEADING
INTRODUCTION
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 11")' is
designed to ensure that claims brought in the federal courts have merit
and are not brought for an improper purpose.2 To accomplish these
goals, the Rule imposes upon an attorney or litigant' a duty to make a
reasonable examination of the merits of and motives behind a claim
before signing a paper and filing it with the court.4 Rule 11 imposes
mandatory sanctions for failure to comply with this duty,5 and the Rule
encourages both courts and litigants to play an active role in deterring
litigation abuses.6
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. I1. The text of Rule 11 provides in relevant part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney.... A party who is not represented by
an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other paper.... The
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harrass or to cause unnecessay
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
Fed. R- Civ. P. 11.
2. See id; Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537
(9th Cir. 1986); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.
1985), modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 121, cert denied, 108 S. CL 269 (1987).
3. Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed upon the signing attorney, the party he or she
represents, or both, or on an unrepresented party who signs a pleading. Fed. R. Civ. P.
11; Fed. R. Civ. P. I I advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200 (1983).
4. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
5. See Fed. R. Civ. P. I I ("the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose... an appropriate sanction") (emphasis added). See, eg., Brown v. Federation of
State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir. 1987); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d
121, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
6. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D.
165, 198 (1983) (amendments "intended to reduce the reluctance of courts to impose
sanctions (citation omitted) by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney");
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Courts, commentators and practitioners debate whether Rule 11 im-
poses a postfiling obligation.7 Such an obligation would require parties
and attorneys to review and reevaluate their positions as a case develops
and to withdraw a complaint upon discovering that it is not adequately
supported by fact or by law.' Proponents of such a continuing duty ar-
gue that it is consistent with the goals of Rule I19 and that other sanc-
tioning mechanisms monitor postfiling conduct less effectively than does
Rule 11.10 Those opposing application of Rule 11 to postfiling conduct
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Rule 11, as
amended, is intended to be applied by district courts vigorously"); infra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text (discussing more active role of courts and attorneys required by cur-
rent Rule).
7. For cases finding a postfiling obligation under Rule 11, see Jackson-Colley v.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 655 F. Supp. 122, 136 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Whittington v. Ohio
River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 208 (E.D. Ky. 1987); Chang v. Meese, 660 F. Supp. 782, 785
(D.P.R. 1987) (dictum); see also cases cited infra note 137. Cases denying a postfiling
obligation under Rule 11 include Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874
(5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987);
Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir.
1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1373 (1987).
Until January 1988, the Fifth Circuit held that the current version of Rule 11 imposed
a continuing duty. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 812 F.2d 984, 988 (5th Cir.
1987), rev'd en banc, 836 F.2d 866, 874 (1988).
For commentary in support of imposing a continuing duty under Rule 11, see Nelken,
Sanctions Under Amended Rule 1--Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between
Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo. L.J. 1313, 1331 (1986); Parness, Groundless
Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal Courts, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 325, 330;
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 58-59 (1976); Schwarzer, Sanctions
Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 200 (1985); Tomlinson,
Opening Statement, 13 Litigation Summer 1987, at 1, 69. For commentary opposed to
the continuing duty, see Levin & Sobel, Achieving Balance in The Developing Law of
Sanctions, 36 Cath. U.L. Rev. 587, 605 (1987).
8. See Whittington v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 208 (E.D. Ky. 1987);
Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 200; see also Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808
F.2d 1119, 1127 (5th Cir. 1987) (imposing upon attorneys and parties a duty to take
reasonable action to ensure that proceedings do not continue without a reasonable basis
in law and fact), overruled, Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th
Cir. 1988) (en banc).
9. See Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 456-
57 (7th Cir. 1987) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (continuing duty
would guard against unnecessarily protracted litigation and waste of court time); Nelken,
supra note 7, at 1331 (imposing a continuing duty would require parties to use informa-
tion gained in discovery to narrow the issues for trial); Risinger, supra note 7, at 59 ("If
the Rule is designed to obtain a lawyer's certification that there are proper issues on
which to spend the court's and the opposing party's time, then only a continuing certifica-
tion requirement fully promotes the purpose of the Rule."); Tomlinson, supra note 7, at
69 (continuing duty to revise pleadings would expedite litigation in accordance with Rule
11).
10. See Parness, supra note 7, at 342 (advocating exclusive use of Rule 11 over the
inherent power of the federal courts or 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Schwarzer, supra note 7, at
195, 206 (Rule 11 is broader in scope than inherent power or 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Note,
The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation By Demanding Professional
Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 300, 326 (1986) [hereinafter Dynamics of Rule 11] (in-
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argue that the plain language of the Rule does not provide for a continu-
ing dutyII and that application of Rule 11 to subsequent pleadings 2 or
that use of alternative sanctioning mechanisms 3 adequately monitors
postfiling conduct.
This Note demonstrates that imposition of a continuing obligation
comports with the spirit of Rule 11 as expressed by its broad scope and
active role in monitoring litigation abuses. Because the plain language of
the Rule does not impose a continuing duty, 4 further amendments to the
Rule are needed to bring a continuing duty indisputably within Rule lI's
purview. Part I of this Note discusses the history and purposes of Rule
11. Part II shows that courts, whether or not they have interpreted Rule
11 to include an obligation to update, feel a need to monitor the validity
of pleadings after they have been filed and that Rule 11 offers a device
superior to alternative mechanisms for monitoring postfiling abuses.
Part III examines the arguments for and against the imposition of a con-
tinuing duty under Rule 11, demonstrating that such a duty is consistent
with the spirit of Rule 11 and the ethical obligations of the legal profes-
sion. This Note concludes that an amendment to Rule 11 expressly im-
posing a postfiling duty would further Rule 1 l's goal of ensuring efficient
and ethical litigation practice in the federal courts.
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF RULE 11
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was enacted originally in 1938 to
deter frivolous actions.' 5 The original Rule' 6 required attorneys to cer-
herent authority and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 ineffective in controlling postfiling misconduct);
see also infra text accompanying notes 96-136 (discussing alternative mechanisms for
monitoring postfiling conduct).
11. See, eg., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thomp-
son, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. CL 1373 (1987).
12. See Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454
(7th Cir. 1987).
13. See eg., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (ample protection provided by § 1927 or inherent power); Gaiardo v. Ethyl
Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987) (attorney's inaction in bad faith may be penalized
by 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272-73 (2d Cir. 1986) (exam-
ining 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and inherent power as alternatives to Rule II
sanctions), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987).
14. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 ("if a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation
of [the] rule" the court shall impose a sanction) (emphasis added); Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835
F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987).
15. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 66 n.24 (2d Cir. 1980); Carter, The History and
Purposes of Rule 11, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 4,4 (1985); Dynamics ofRule 11, supra note 10,
at 312.
16. The relevant text of former Rule 11 provided:
Every pleading... shall be signed.... The signature of an attorney constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowl-
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tify that "good ground" existed to support their pleadings. 7 It provided
for the discretionary 8 imposition of sanctions on attorneys who submit-
ted pleadings that were unsigned, unsupported, or interposed for delay. I9
It also permitted the courts to strike pleadings that did not comply with
the Rule.2" Experience showed that in practice Rule 11 failed to deter
abuses in litigation.2' Courts found the Rule difficult to apply and en-
force and so were reluctant to use it.
22
This ineffectiveness resulted from several deficiencies in the Rule. For
example, the standard requiring "good ground to support" a pleading
was vague. 23 Under this standard, an attorney was required to investi-
gate facts and present them "to the best of his knowledge, information,
edge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is
not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to
defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the
action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary
action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 540-41 (1982).
17. See id.; Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536
(9th Cir. 1986); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (per cuiam).
18. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 540-41 (1982) ("an attorney may be
subjected to appropriate disciplinary action") (emphasis added).
19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 540 (1982); Galef v. Alexander, 615
F.2d 51, 66 n.24 (2d Cir. 1980); Miller v. Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1061-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Carter, supra note 15, at 4.
20. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 540 (1982); Incomco v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 558 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1977); Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214,
215 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983); see Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 191 (1988) (citing Miller
& Culp, Federal Practice: Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rule of Civil Proce-
dure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, col. 3.); see also, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs.,
Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 869-70 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Rule 11 rarely applied before its
amendment in 1983); Nemeroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
("Rule 11 speaks in plainly subjective terms"); Incomco v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
558 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1977) (former Rule 11 provision for striking pleadings should
be "used sparingly and only in compelling situations").
22. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 869-70 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 453 (7th
Cir. 1987); Carter, supra note 15, at 6-9; Vairo, supra note 21, at 191.
One study showed that between 1938 and 1976 only 19 cases reported alleged Rule 11
violations. See Risinger, supra note 7, at 34-35; see also Tomlinson, supra note 7, at 1
(discussing statistical findings of Rule 11 scholars). The reluctance of courts to impose
sanctions provided one indication that the Rule needed amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983); Brown v. Federa-
tion of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Ronco, Inc., 105
F.R.D. 493, 496 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Since the 1983 amendments, hundreds of Rule 11
opinions have been published, demonstrating the courts' willingness to use the new Rule.
See Vairo, supra note 21, at 199; see also Tomlinson, supra note 7, at 1 ("If the frequency
of Rule I l's use is a measure of the rule's effectiveness, then amending Rule 11 made the
rule much more effective.").
23. See Carter, supra note 15, at 5; Vairo, supra note 21, at 190-91.
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and belief."'24 Courts interpreted this as a subjective and rather vague
requirement of good faith25 and were reluctant to impose sanctions under
it.26 In addition, the only improper purpose for conducting litigation ac-
knowledged by the original Rule was delay.27 The Rule failed to recog-
nize that litigation can be conducted for other improper purposes,28 such
as to mislead the court,29 to harrass an opponent, 30 to impose defense
costs,31 or to pressure an opponent into a settlement.32 Last, courts were
reluctant to invoke the Rule because they viewed the striking of a faulty
pleading33 as a harsh penalty. 34
In 1983 the Rule was materially amended 35 in an attempt to increase
its effectiveness. 36 The amendments 37 also attempted to institute the
24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 540 (1982).
25. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 870 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc);
Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 453 (7th Cir.
1987); Nemerotf v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Carter, supra
note 15, at 5-6.
26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.LD. 165, 198
(1983); supra note 22.
27. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 540 (1982).
28. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-
199 (1983); Vairo, Analysis of August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in ALI-ABA, 1 Civil Practice and Effective Litigation Techniques in Federal
and State Courts 59, 67 (Aug. 1985 ed.); C. Wiggins, Remarks at the Annual Judicial
Conference Second Judicial Circuit of the United States (September 30, 1987), reprinted
in 101 F.R.D. 161, 178 (1984) [hereinafter Wiggins Remarks]; Note, Plausible Pleadings"
Developing Standards For Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 633 (1987).
29. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir.
1987) (dissent from denial of en banc rehearing).
30. Harassment is listed as an example of an improper purpose in amended Rule 11.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Goad v. United States, 661 F. Supp. 1073, 1081 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd,
837 F.2d 1096 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1079 (1988); Damiani v. Adams, 657 F.
Supp. 1409, 1418 (S.D. Cal. 1987).
31. See Wiggins Remarks, supra note 28, at 178. The amended Rule lists causing
"needless increase in the cost of litigation" as an improper purpose. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
11.
32. See Nelken, supra note 7, at 1331.
33. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 540 (1982).
34. See Incomco v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 558 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1977);
Bertucelli v. Carreras, 467 F.2d 214, 215 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
35. For relevant text of amended Rule 11, see supra note 1. The 1983 amendments to
Rule 11 significantly changed the Rule. See Adduono v. World Hockey Ass'n, 824 F.2d
617, 621 (8th Cir. 1987); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1185 (9th Cir.), modified, 803
F.2d 1085 (1986); Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 997, 999 (1983);
Vairo, supra note 21, at 193-94.
36. See Fed. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-
99 (1983); Carter, supra note 15, at 6-7,9; Letter from Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman,
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to Judge Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman, and Mem-
bers of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (March 9, 1982),
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 191-92 (1983) [hereinafter Letter from Mansfield].
37. Amendments to the Federal Rules are promulgated by the Supreme Court pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982). Under this system, the Judicial Conference of the United
States serves as a standing "advisory committee" to the Supreme Court. See 2 J. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice 1.02a[2] (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988). The Chief Justice of the
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broader policy goals of curbing the expense and court delays caused by
litigation of frivolous claims,38 and making the litigation process run
more efficiently. 9 The amendments expanded the Rule to prohibit filing
of pleadings for any improper purpose' and to impose mandatory sanc-
tions on both attorneys and litigants,41 including litigants appearing
without counsel.42
Today Rule 11 requires both courts43 and attorneys" to take a more
United States appoints advisory committees to formulate proposals for recommendation
first to the Judicial Conference and then to the Supreme Court. See id. The Supreme
Court submits proposed rules to Congress. If Congress does not amend or repeal them
within 90 days, the proposed rules become effective. Id. The 1983 amendments were
approved by the Supreme Court on April 28, 1983, and became effective on August 1,
1983. See Amendments to Rules, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
38. See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Zaldivar
v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1986); Wiggins Remarks, supra note
28, at 177.
This goal of reducing expense includes curbing the costs of defending against a baseless
claim. See, e.g., Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1437-38 (7th
Cir. 1987); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985); Lepucki v. Van Wormer,
765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985).
39. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir.
1986); Letter from Mansfield, supra note 36, at 194.
The amendments were also designed to curb the waste of judicial resources caused by
meritless pleadings. See Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809
F.2d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1987) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
827 (1985); Chang v. Meese, 660 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D.P.R. 1987); cf. Talamini v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1073-74 (1985) (discussing Supreme Court Rule 49.2, which
prohibits frivolous appeal or frivolous petition for writ of certiorari, the opinion of Chief
Justice Burger stated "every misuse of any court's time impinges on the right of other
litigants with valid or at least arguable claims to gain access to the judicial process. The
time this Court expends examining and processing frivolous applications.., is time that
could be devoted to considering claims which merit consideration.").
This desire for greater judicial efficiency reflects a concern that frivolous litigation
brings the civil justice system into disrepute. See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 182; see also
Colorado Chiropractic Council v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 650 F. Supp. 231, 239 (D.
Colo. 1986) (citing Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 182).
40. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809
F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir. 1987) (dissent from denial of an en banc rehearing); Wiggins
Remarks, supra note 28, at 178; Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards For
Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harvard L. Rev. 630, 633 (1987).
41. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200
(1983); Collins v. Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 964 & n.2 (11 th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Federation
of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803
F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987).
42. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199-
200 (1983). See, e.g., Hilgeford v. Peoples' Bank, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 230, 235 (N.D. Ind.
1986); Taylor v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (N.D.N.Y. 1984).
43. See Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1433 (7th Cir.
1987); Hurd v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 824 F.2d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 1987); Vairo, supra note
21, at 190; Dynamics ofRule 11, supra note 10, at 327. The amended Rule makes explicit
the court's authority to impose sanctions on its own motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200 (1983); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
44. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
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active role in eliminating meritless litigation. The amended Rule makes
detection and punishment of frivolous actions part of the court's respon-
sibility,45 encouraging courts to be more involved in the pretrial disposi-
tion of claims. The increased responsibility imposed upon lawyers and
parties includes imposition of a stricter standard of "reasonableness
under the circumstances" for filing a pleading." The Advisory Commit-
tee on Federal Civil Rules intended that the reasonableness standard be
more stringent than the original good faith formula47 and that a greater
range of circumstances trigger violations of the Rule.48 Under this new
standard, an attorney must conduct a reasonable inquiry into the merits
of a claim before filing a paper with the court.49 The drafters of the new
Rule deleted the previous reference to willfulness, 50 making merely negli-
(1983); Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th
Cir. 1987); Vairo, supra note 21, at 190. Pro se litigants also must comply with amended
Rule 11. See supra note 42.
45. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200
(1983); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
46. See Fed. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.RD. 165, 198
(1983). By contrast, under former Rule 11, a showing of subjective bad faith was re-
quired to trigger disciplinary action against an attorney. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28
U.S.C. app. 540, 540-41 (1982); Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight,
Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 453 (7th Cir. 1987); Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 10, at 313; see
also Nemeroffv. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (applying former
Rule 11).
47. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-
99 (1983); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir.
1987); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985),
modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
48. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-
99 (1983); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir.
1987); Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d at 253.
49. See Fed. R Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir.
1986); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985),
modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 121 , cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987). The advi-
sory committee explained that:
what constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much
time for investigation was available to the signer, whether he had to rely on a
client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other
paper; whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible
view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another
member of the bar.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983).
See, e.g., Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987);
Donaldson v. Clark, 819, F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Pantry Queen
Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987). Courts
have construed the new standard of conduct under Rule 11 to be an objective standard
instead of the subjective good faith standard of the prior Rule. See, e.g., Pantry Queen
Foods, 809 F.2d at 453; Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Eastway Constr. Corp., 762 F.2d at 253.
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200
(1983). See Smith v. United Transp. Union Local No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 101 (S.D. Cal.
1984).
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gent or reckless conduct sufficient to trigger sanctions under Rule 11.51
In addition, a party seeking sanctions under amended Rule 11 has a duty
to notify the court promptly upon discovering that the Rule has been
violated.5 2
The mandatory imposition of sanctions for violations represents an-
other major change in the Rule." Under the former Rule, imposition of
sanctions for violations was discretionary. 4 To reduce the reluctance of
the courts to award sanctions, 55 the amended Rule mandates imposition
of sanctions, which may include an award of attorney's fees, once a viola-
tion has been found. 6 Courts retain discretion, however, to determine
the type and amount of the sanction to be awarded57 and are not limited
to awarding attorney's fees.5"
Thus, the current version of Rule 11 has a sharper "bite" than did the
former Rule;59 it applies to a broader range of parties and conduct, and
its mandatory nature encourages its use.'
II. THE NEED FOR IMPOSING A CONTINUING OBLIGATION TO
MONITOR POSTFILING CONDUCT
Although some earlier decisions held that Rule 11 imposes a duty to
withdraw or amend a claim that "became meritless" after it was filed, 6 '
51. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987); Basch v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986);
Blanchette v. Cataldo, 734 F.2d 869, 871 (1st Cir. 1984); Duncan v. WJLA-TV, Inc., 106
F.R.D. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1984). The advisory committee contemplated, however, that courts
take the willfulness of a violator into account in considering the nature and severity of the
sanctions to be imposed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 200 (1983); see Parness, supra note 7, at 342.
52. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200
(1983) ("A party seeking sanctions should give notice to the court and the offending party
promptly upon discovering a basis for doing so."); United Food & Commercial Workers
Union Local No. 115 v. Armour and Co., 106 F.R.D. 345, 350 (N.D. Cal. 1985); see also
infra text accompanying notes 67-78.
53. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199
(1983) ("sanctions" placed in caption to stress deterrent orientation of Rule); Vairo,
supra note 21, at 193 ("Rule 11 's [mandatory] sanctions provision represents an aggres-
sive attempt to remedy the ineffectiveness of its predecessor").
54. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. 540, 540-41 (1982) ("an attorney may be sub-
jected to appropriate disciplinary action") (emphasis added).
55. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983); supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 5.
57. See Fed. R. Civ. P. I 1 (the Rule authorizes "an appropriate sanction"); infra
notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
59. See Carter, supra note 15, at 4.
60. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-
99 (1983); supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
61. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 812 F.2d 984, 988-89 (5th Cir. 1987),
rev'd en banc, 836 F.2d 866, 874 (1988); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Mach., 581
F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984); Brownlow v. General Servs. Employees Union, 35
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,886, at 35,898 (N.D. IIl. 1984).
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recent cases in the federal courts of appeals have generally denied the
existence of such a duty.6 2 However, sanctions continue to be imposed
upon parties and attorneys who fail to take proper remedial action when
a case "becomes meritless."' 3 By finding a duty of mitigation under Rule
111 and by using combined sanctioning mechanisms to monitor postfil-
ing conduct, 65 some courts in effect have imposed a continuing duty on
attorneys and their clients without expressly recognizing such a duty
under Rule 11.66 Thus, recent case law demonstrates that a need exists
for an effective mechanism to prevent the continuation of baseless claims.
In addressing this need, however, mechanisms inferior to the sanctioning
power provided by Rule 11 have been implemented.
A. The Duty of Mitigation Under Rule 11
In order to reduce the harmful effects of frivolous claims, Rule 11 has
been interpreted to include a duty to mitigate fees.6" Pursuant to this
duty to mitigate, parties or attorneys defending against baseless claims
have an obligation under the Rule to bring frivolous pleadings to the
court's attention,68 thereby keeping the costs of defense to a minimum.69
62. See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 874; Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir.
1987); Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 455 (7th
Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1373 (1987); Norton Tire Co. v. Tire Kingdom Co., 116 F.R.D. 236, 240 (S.D. Fla.
1987).
63. See, e.g., Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 821-22 (S.D. Ga. 1987);
Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 684, 692
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D.
Minn. 1984).
64. See, e-g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (nonviolating party's duty of mitigation under Rule 11 includes obligation to
incur only reasonable costs of defense and duty to notify court of opponent's Rule 11
violation); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir.
1987) (duty of mitigation under Rule 11 "should ensure that party requesting fees has not
needlessly protracted the litigation"); Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (1Ith Cir.
1987) (en bane) (giving notice of Rule 11 violation can save monetary and judicial re-
sources); Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 684,
692-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court reduced unreasonably large fee award requested by attor-
neys who defended against a claim they knew to be baseless).
65. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
66. See Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 1985) (impos-
ing sanctions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 and 37(d) for delay in discovery
proceedings), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986); Selbst v. Touche Ross & Co., 116
F.R.D. 665, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (using combined sanctioning mechanisms to sanction
continuatuion of a claim); Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc.,
114 F.R.D. 684, 692-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (imposing continuing duty of mitigation under
Rule 11 on party defending against baseless claim); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road
Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984) (using combined sanctioning mecha-
nisms to sanction continuation of a claim).
67. See cases cited supra note 64.
68. See cases cited supra note 64.
69. See cases cited supra note 64; see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union
Local No. 115 v. Armour & Co., 106 F.R.D. 345, 350 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (early notice can
prevent the costs of defending a frivolous lawsuit from becoming excessive).
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By enforcing a duty to mitigate under Rule 11, courts have recognized
that continuation of frivolous claims is harmful.7" The mitigation duty
in effect places a continuin g obligation on defendants by denying a por-
tion of the fee award to them when they allow a baseless claim to
continue.71
The requirement of mitigation stems from the Rule's allowance of only
a "reasonable" attorney's fee to parties who have defended against a
baseless claim.72 If a defendant delays in informing the court that the
claim is baseless and continues to litigate against it, the amount of attor-
ney's fees he incurs is no longer reasonable, and the fee sanction levied
against the plaintiff will be reduced accordingly.73
Thus, the duty to mitigate illustrates that courts are concerned with
limiting the costs of frivolous litigation.74 Such costs naturally increase
the longer a meritless claim remains active. 75 Requiring a defendant to
mitigate by keeping costs down and by promptly notifying the court that
a claim is baseless, without imposing a concommitant duty on the propo-
nent to minimize costs and delay in litigation by amending or withdraw-
ing a baseless claim,76 places the sole affirmative duty to prevent damage
on the person defending a baseless claim.77 Because courts already use
Rule 11 through the mitigation doctrine to require defendants to prevent
the harmful effects caused by the continuation of meritless claims, fair-
ness seems to require that they also impose on proponents of claims an
70. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
bane); United Food & Commercial Workers v. Armour and Co., 106 F.R.D. 345, 350
(N.D. Cal. 1985); see also Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
bane) (giving notice of Rule 11 violation can save monetary and judicial resources).
71. See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878-80; Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830
F.2d 1429, 1439 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1987); Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 200.
72. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878-79
(5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Brown, 830 F.2d at 1433; Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d
479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987); Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc.,
114 F.R.D. 684, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
73. See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 879; Brown, 830 F.2d at 1439 & n.6; Donaldson v.
Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (en bane); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165,
1184-85 (9th Cir.), modified, 803 F.2d 1085 (1986); Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 203.
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
75. See Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 456-
57 (7th Cir. 1987) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Schwarzer,
supra note 7, at 200-01.
76. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
bane) (imposing duty to notify court of violation but holding that proponent of now
baseless claim has no duty to amend); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483-84 (3d
Cir. 1987) (same).
77. This inequity exists in the context of a claim that becomes meritless after it has
been filed. Under the prevailing view, the proponent of the now baseless claim has no
obligation to withdraw the claim or to notify the court that the claim is baseless. See,
e.g., Thomas, 836 F.2d at 874. The party defending against the baseless claim, however,
has a duty to keep its costs of defense down, see Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Inte-
grated Resources, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 684, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), and a duty to notify the
proponent that the claim lacks merit, see United Food & Commercial Workers Union
Local No. 115 v. Armour & Co., 106 F.R.D. 345, 349-50 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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affirmative duty to prevent damage in the form of a continuing obligation
to withdraw a claim if it becomes baseless.
The mitigation cases also illustrate the courts' concern with dismissing
baseless claims on a timely basis,78 further demonstrating the need for a
continuing obligation. At least one court has considered withdrawal by
the proponent of a frivolous claim as another factor of mitigation. 9
Preventing the continuation of meritless claims through prompt amend-
ment or withdrawal comports with the dual policies behind Rule 11: to
increase judicial efficiency and to minimize costs and delays in litiga-
tion.8 o Thus, the Rule is ideally suited to bringing about prompt termi-
nation of baseless claims.8 1
B. Combined Sanctioning Powers
De facto continuing obligations also have been imposed by courts us-
ing a combination of mechanisms to sanction the continuation of a merit-
less claim.8 2  These mechanisms include 28 U.S.C. § 1927,83 which
prohibits multiplication of proceedings in federal courts, and the inherent
power of the federal courts,8 4 which enables courts to take actions neces-
sary to exercise their judicial power. Courts frequently will combine the
78. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1987);
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (1lth Cir. 1987) (en banc).
79. See Levine v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 664 F. Supp. 733, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Con-
versely, some courts have considered the continuation of a violation of Rule 11 as con-
duct that compounds the initial Rule I 1 violation. See Saturn Systems, Inc. v. Saturn
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 868, 871 (D. Minn. 1987); Barlow v. McLeod, 666 F. Supp. 222, 229-
30 (D.D.C. 1986).
80. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text.
81. See Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 456-
57 (7th Cir. 1987) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Parness, supra
note 7, at 330.
82. See Selbst v. Touche Ross & Co., 116 F.R.D. 665, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (imposing
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and a special fee-shifting provision in Title VII); Woodfork
ex. reL Houston v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100, 105 (N.D. Miss. 1985) (sanctions imposed
pursuant to Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F.
Supp. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (failure to dismiss baseless claim sanctioned pursuant to
fee-shifting provision in Title VII and inherent power); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and
Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984) (sanctions imposed pursuant to
Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927); see also Brownlow v. General Servs. Employees Union,
35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,886, at 35,898 (N.D. II!. 1984) (continuation of merit-
less claim sanctioned under Rule 11; court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides addi-
tional sanctioning authority).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) is a general federal fee-shifting statute that empowers a
court to assess against an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreason-
ably and vexatiously" his opponent's excess costs and attorney's fees incurred as a result
of such conduct. See id.; Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1511 (10th Cir. 1987). For
further discussion of the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 105-18 and accompa-
nying text.
84. The inherent power of the federal courts is power vested in the courts upon their
creation and not derived from any statute. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d
557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc). For further discussion of the scope of inherent power,
see infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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use of Rule 11 (to sanction claims that were baseless at the time the law-
suit was filed) with the use of one of these other mechanisms (to sanction
claims that were continued unreasonably)., 5
The use of combined powers to impose sanctions for continuing a base-
less lawsuit demonstrates that courts need a mechanism to monitor
postfiling conduct.8 6 The combination of mechanisms to monitor postfil-
ing conduct has resulted in inaccurate analysis in continuing violation
situations, thus obscuring the guidelines attorneys follow to avoid plead-
ing abuse. Some opinions cite authority imprecisely when sanctioning an
unreasonably continued lawsuit.8 7 For example, some cases have been
decided by using Rule 11 in combination with other mechanisms that
require a subjective standard of good faith; 8 such an analysis potentially
could thwart the scope of the amended Rule. In addition, mechanisms
other than Rule 11 that are being used to monitor continuing violations
lack the flexibility 9 of sanctioning intended under Rule 11 because the
provisions of those alternative mechanisms limit judges as to the type of
sanction they may impose.90
As factual situations arise that create a need to sanction parties for
failure to withdraw or amend a pleading, courts often look to Rule 11 for
a solution.91 For example, sanctions have been imposed on the ground
85. See Selbst v. Touche Ross & Co., 116 F.R.D. 665, 669 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1987);
Woodfork ex. rel. Houston v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100, 105 (N.D. Miss. 1985); Van Berkel
v. Fox Farm and Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984).
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. See Levine v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 664 F. Supp. 733, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court
refused to sanction plaintiff who withdrew complaint that violated Rule 11); Van Berkel
v. Fox Farm and Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984) (imposing sanc-
tions under Rule 11 and § 1927 but neglecting to apply requisite bad faith standard under
§ 1927).
88. In Van Berkel the court imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule I 1 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, which imposes a subjective good faith standard of conduct on attorneys, for
prefiling violations and for failure to dismiss a baseless claim. See 581 F. Supp at 1251; 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). The court appears to have ignored the § 1927 bad faith standard.
It summarily held that counsel's failure to withdraw his claim constituted unreasonable
and vexatious litigation. Van Berkel, 581 F. Supp. at 1251. Thus only the objective stan-
dard of Rule 11 was actually applied, although § 1927 was used to sanction the postfiling
conduct. Id.
89. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (Rule authorizes "an appropriate sanction"); supra notes
41, 48 and accompanying text; infra note 131 and accompanying text.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (excess fees for vexatious attorney conduct); 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (reasonable attorney's fee). Although a fee award is the most com-
mon sanction imposed under Rule 11, the Rule does not limit courts to awarding attor-
ney's fees. See infra note 127.
91. Rule I 1 has been used to sanction the failure to amend pleadings or dismiss merit-
less claims in several different contexts. In Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d
165 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986), the court sanctioned an attorney
under Rule 11 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(d) (which authorizes sanctions for
failure to answer interrogatories) because a delay in amending his response to interroga-
tories caused his opponent to incur extra defense costs. See Basch, 777 F.2d at 173-74.
Thus, a continuing obligation was imposed on an attorney in the form of a duty to inform
an opponent of an important development in a litigation. Id.
In Kendrick v. Zanides, 609 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Cal. 1985), Rule 11 was invoked to
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that the attorney or litigant continued to pursue a baseless claim, in addi-
tion to neglecting their prefiling duty on that claim.9 2 The initial viola-
tion of Rule 11 enables the court to sanction continuation of the suit
without expressly imposing a duty to withdraw the pleading.93 More-
over, discussion of a continuing duty to refrain from persisting in merit-
less litigation can be found in Rule 11 cases sanctioning postfiling
conduct.
94
Although judges are not without means to sanction postfdling conduct,
the resulting decisions lack clarity and consistency." A clear and flexible
sanction the continuation of a claim in an amended complaint after its removal from state
to federal court. See iL at 1170. The Federal Rules do not govern actions filed in state
court. Thus, Rule 11 does not apply to plaintiff's complaint when defendant removes
plaintiff's action into federal court. See Stiefvater Real Estate, Inc. v. Hinsdale, 812 F.2d
805, 809 (2d Cir. 1987); Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 820 (S.D. Ga. 1987);
Kendrick, 609 F. Supp. at 1170. In Kendrick, plaintiff was sanctioned for bringing un-
supported charges in an amended complaint filed after removal of the action. See Ken-
drick, 609 F. Supp. at 1172. The court held, however, that the discretionary aspect of
Rule 11 sanctions allowed it to sanction plaintiff for the costs of the entire action and did
not limit the sanction to costs attributable to the amended complaint. See id. at 1173.
Because the sanctions reached the whole action, in effect sanctions were imposed for
continuation of the baseless claim.
92. See Markel v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 657 F. Supp. 1102, 1112 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Jack-
son-Colley v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 655 F. Supp. 122, 135-36 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Barlow
v. McLeod, 666 F. Supp. 222, 229 (D.D.C. 1986).
93. See supra note 92.
94. See Markel, 657 F.2d at 1112 ("there came a point in [the] action in which plain-
tiffs' continuance of the action was unjustified"); Smith v. United Transp. Union Local
No. 81, 594 F. Supp. 96, 101 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (court stated that "[w]hen confronted with
the correct citations and holdings in plaintiff's reply brief and by the Court during oral
argument, counsel for the [defendant] remained unrepentant .... [That] conduct...
stands out as an appropriate case for the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions."); see also
Collins v. Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 965 (11th Cir. 1987) (court sanctioned attorneys under
Rule 11, stating that "[w]hen it becomes apparent that discoverable evidence will not
bear out the claim, the litigant and his attorney have a duty to discontinue their quest").
In Levine v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 664 F. Supp. 733, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), although
the court was bound by precedent set in Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir.
1986), which denies a continuing duty under Rule 11, it stated that:
Although a party or counsel is subject to sanctions [under Rule 11] for filing a
spurious complaint, it is important to distinguish claims that are dropped after
the pleading stage from those that a plaintiff continues to press even after it has
become clear that they stand no chance of success. See e.g., Fuji Photo Film
U.S.A., Inc. v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 112 F.R.D. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(Carter, J.) (refusal to drop spurious claims warrants sanctions); Steinberg v. St.
Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Goettel, J.)
(same).
Levine, 664 F. Supp. at 737. Because the plaintiff withdrew her claims, thereby saving the
court the effort of assessing the merits of her claims and sparing the defendant costs of
defense, the court declined to impose a sanction. Id. This case demonstrates the lack of
clarity in continuing violation decisions. The cases cited by the court in Levine to support
the proposition that continuation of a baseless claim warrants sanctions were inherent
power and prefiling violations cases, while the decision itself was based on Rule 11.
95. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text; see also Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) ("Rule 11 decisions by courts
have not always been consistent, producing confusion among the bench and bar, as well
as inequitable results." (footnote omitted)).
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mechanism is needed to monitor postfiling conduct. Examination of the
alternative mechanisms for preventing unreasonably continued litigation
demonstrates that Rule 11 is the most effective mechanism for preventing
such abuse.
C. Alternative Devices Insufficient to Monitor Postfiling Conduct
An argument has been made that Rule 11 need not be used to impose a
postfiling duty because courts have other means, such as the inherent
power of the federal courts and specific statutory powers, to impose sanc-
tions against attorneys who continue litigation in bad faith. These alter-
native devices, however, are insufficient to monitor litigation abuse
because they lack the flexibility and breadth of Rule 11.
1. Inherent Power
The inherent power of the federal courts is that which is necessary to
enable them to exercise their judicial powers.96 Inherent power includes
the power to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices.97
For example, courts have used the inherent power doctrine to dismiss an
action for lack of prosecution,98 or to grant attorney's fees to a prevailing
party when his opponent has acted in bad faith. 99 An inherent power
award of attorney's fees has been imposed on a litigant who has con-
ducted litigation in bad faith,"° and it has also been used to assess fees
against an attorney who willfully abused the judicial process.10'
Although the inherent power of the courts appears expansive, in prac-
tice awards pursuant to the doctrine are rare. °2 Unlike Rule 11, inher-
ent power awards are restricted to instances when a party or an attorney
has acted in bad faith.'03 In addition, the Supreme Court has discour-
96. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (describing inher-
ent power as power "necessary to the exercise of all others" and "not immediately de-
rived from statute"). A precise definition of inherent power has eluded the courts for
many years. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561-62 (3d Cir. 1985).
"[The notion of inherent power has been described as nebulous, and its bounds as 'shad-
owy'." Id. (quoting Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum. L.
Rev. 480, 485 (1958)).
97. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15
(1973); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
98. See Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31; Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d
915, 916 (9th Cir. 1987).
99. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975).
100. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). "'[B ]ad faith' may be found, not only in
the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in the conduct of the litigation." Id.
101. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980).
102. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 767; 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
54.77 [2] (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988); Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 10, at 310-11.
103. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975);
F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co. 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974);
Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1087-88 (2d Cir.
1977).
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aged expansion of the courts' inherent powers because it lies beyond the
reach of legislative control."' These limitations make the doctrine's use
in curbing postfiling abuses insufficient.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Some have suggested the use of Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United
States Code' as another alternative to Rule 11. " This section is enti-
tled "Counsel's Liability for Excessive Costs," and it imposes liability on
attorneys who conduct litigation in bad faith.'0 7 This alternative for
monitoring postfiling conduct is inferior to Rule 11 because section 1927
is merely a fee-shifting' 08 statute under which an attorney can be assessed
only excess costs and attorney's fees," 9 while Rule 11 allows the court to
tailor an appropriate sanction to the facts of the case." 0 In addition to
financial penalties, courts may sanction by warning, oral reprimand or
written admonition under Rule 11.1" Furthermore, because imposition
of sanctions under section 1927 is permissive rather than mandatory," 2
some technical violations may go unsanctioned." 3
In addition, the mechanism provided by section 1927 is a limited
104. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy per-
sonally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred be-
cause of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). Section 1927 initially was meant to monitor United States At-
torneys, who were paid by the pleading. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 759 & n.6 (1980); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985).
106. See e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc); Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454
(7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cerL denied,
107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987).
107. See supra note 105; Parness, supra note 7, at 342.
108. Fee-shifting statutes permit courts to override the common law american rule,
which provides that each party to a litigation bears his own costs, and allows courts to
transfer the costs of legal fees from one party to his opponent or the opposing attorney.
See Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 8 (1984); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir.
1985).
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 983 (6th Cir. 1987), cerL
denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3608 (1988).
110. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200
(1983); infra note 127 and accompanying text.
111. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987).
112. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 876 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir. 1985).
113. See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 876 (28 U.S.C. § 1927 gives court discretion to deny
sanctions if it concludes that a fee award is unwarranted); Burull v. First Nat'l Bank of
Minneapolis, 831 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) (district court did not abuse its dicretion
to deny sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 where vexatiousness or bad faith not clearly
demonstrated); Nelken, supra note 7, at 1321 (court has discretion to deny sanctions
under § 1927).
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one 114 and therefore ineffective as an alternative to Rule 11. Section 1927
sanctions can be imposed only against attorneys, 15 whereas Rule 11
sanctions are available against both attorneys and their clients. 116 Sec-
tion 1927, like the inherent power doctrine, also encompasses a subjective
standard of bad faith.'" 7 Under Rule 11, however, because an attorney is
held to a standard of reasonable inquiry under the circumstances, the
court need not find that an attorney or party acted willfully before impos-
ing a sanction.' " Thus, Rule 1l's scope and flexibility make it a more
effective mechanism to monitor postfiling abuses.
3. Fee-Shifting Statutes
Unlike section 1927, which applies to all litigation in the federal
courts, a number of federal fee-shifting statutes' ' 9 are action-specific. 120
Courts that refuse to apply Rule 11 to postfiling conduct have suggested
that these fee-shifting statutes provide another alternative. 121 These stat-
utes provide for the prevailing plaintiff in certain types of actions to re-
cover attorney's fees from the losing party. 22 Some statutes also impose
an obligation on litigants to refrain from continuing meritless actions. 123
114. Vairo, supra note 21, at 192.
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1273 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987); Dynamics ofRule 11, supra note 10, at 311-12,
326.
116. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273 ("if a
claim is groundless, the mere fact that the plaintiff relies on his attorney's erroneous
contrary advice does not relieve him of liability [under Rule 11]").
117. Section 1927 has been reserved for situations involving a "serious and studied
disregard for the orderly processes of justice." Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404
F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969); see Oliveri, 803 F.2d at
1273; Vairo, supra note 21, at 192; Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 10, at 312. But see
Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569, 1574 (7th Cir. 1987) (reckless conduct can trigger
sanctions under § 1927); In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987) (imposing objec-
tive test under § 1927, but stating that negligence will not support a § 1927 award), cert.
denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3608 (1988).
118. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Vairo, supra note 21, at 193; supra note 51.
119. See supra note 108.
120. Congress has enacted over 100 fee shifting statutes applicable to specific causes of
action. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (Appendix to Opinion of Brennan,
J., dissenting) (providing a comprehensive listing).
For example, actions for employment discrimination brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 are subject to the fee-switching provision of § 706(k) of Title
VII, which provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). A similar statute governs other civil rights actions. See 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title... the court, in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs.").
121. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1373 (1987); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 252 (2d Cir.
1985), modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 121, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
122. See supra note 120.
123. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), § 706(k) of Title
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Although it is true that certain fee-shifting statutes already impose a con-
tinuing duty in specific contexts, 12 4 the existence of those statutes does
not obviate the need for a general continuing obligation under Rule 11.
First, fee-shifting statutes often apply to the losing party and not to his
attorney, 125 whereas the amendments to Rule 11 specifically broadened
the Rule's scope to apply to attorneys as well.'1 6 Second, although fee-
shifting is the most commonly imposed Rule 11 sanction, 2" the Rule is
not merely a fee-shifting device. Rule 11 sanctions are available not only
as compensation for the costs of defending against a baseless action,' 28
but as punishment and as a method of deterrence. 29 In suggesting that
fee-shifting statutes offer a viable alternative to Rule 11 sanctions, some
courts and commentators have overlooked the fact that Rule 11 makes
available a far wider variety of sanctions. 30 The ability to tailor the
VII was interpreted to include a continuing obligation. Although the plain language of
the statute does not include a continuing duty, the Supreme Court stated that "a plaintiff
should not be assessed his opponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds that his claim
was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after
it clearly became so." Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court has held that the same standard is applicable in determining a fee award
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980) (per
curiam); see also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (apply-
ing Hughes v. Rowe standard to 42 U.S.C. § 1988), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987).
124. See supra note 123.
125. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) authorize the imposi-
tion of fees only against parties to the litigation. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 761 (1980); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987); supra note 120.
126. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
127. Although fee-shifting is the most common sanction imposed under Rule 11, see
Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Nelken, supra note
7, at 1333; Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 10, at 329, Rule I 1 authorizes "an appropri-
ate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 481-83 (3d Cir. 1987); Parness, supra note 7, at
353; Note, Litigant Responsibility: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Its Application,
27 B.C.L. Rev. 385, 390 (1986) [hereinafter Litigant Responsibility]. Recent Rule 11
cases have encouraged the use of sanctions other than fee awards. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Cabell v. Petty,
810 F.2d 463, 466-67 (4th Cir. 1987); Vairo, supra note 21, at 230-31.
128. See Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1437-38 (7th Cir.
1987); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir. 1985).
129. See Fed. R Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199-
200 (1983); Brown, 830 F.2d at 1438.
130. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482, 484 (3d Cir. 1987); Collins v.
Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 966 (11th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds.,
830 F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1987).
Although some form of sanction is mandatory once a court finds that the rule has been
violated, the court "retains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations
of the rule." Fed. R Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165,
200 (1983). See Collins, 834 F.2d at 966; Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th
Cir. 1987) (en banc). Rule 11 permits, but does not require, the district court to award
attorney's fees as a sanction. See Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at 482-83 (amount and type of sanc-
tion depends on circumstances giving rise to the sanction); Doyle v. United States, 817
F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 sanctions not limited to attorneys' fees). Sanc-
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sanction to the particular violation provided by Rule 11 is not present in
the fee-shifting statutes.1 3
1
Last, the policy underlying special fee-shifting statutes differs com-
pletely from that underlying Rule 11.132 For example, fee-shifting provi-
sions like section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), are
designed to encourage certain plaintiffs, such as those alleging a violation
of their civil rights, to file lawsuits to enforce important public poli-
cies. 133 The goal of Rule 11 is not to encourage certain litigation through
fee-shifting, but to correct and prevent litigation abuse. 1 34 Although spe-
cial fee-shifting provisions in civil rights cases may overlap with a contin-
uing obligation under Rule 11, the existence of one mechanism does not
eliminate the need for the other.
When courts and critics claim that alternative sanctioning mechanisms
obviate the need for the imposition of a continuing duty under Rule
11,135 they fail to recognize that Rule 1l 's structure provides a much
tions other than financial penalties are available under Rule 11. See supra note 111 and
accompanying text. In the case of a claim that was unreasonably continued, a fee award
is a logical sanction. Unlike other mechanisms, however, Rule 11 enables a court to
award a larger or smaller amount or to issue a formal reprimand or impose an educa-
tional sanction in addition to a fee award. See, e.g., Stevens v. City of Brockton, 676 F.
Supp. 26, 27 (D. Mass. 1987) (judge ordered attorneys who had violated Rule 11 to
attend a seminar on Federal Practice and Procedure).
Numerous examples illustrate the flexibility Rule 11 allows in imposing sanctions. In
Blanchette v. Cataldo, 734 F.2d 869, 871 (Ist Cir. 1984), the court imposed Rule 11
sanctions on an attorney who allowed a freight claims agent to sign his name to
thousands of complaints and who failed to examine the complaints to verify whether they
stated a legitimate cause of action. As a remedy, the court ordered the attorney to review
the suits still on the court's dockets and to file appropriate affidavits. See id.
In Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1108 (1986), the court awarded a sanction in the amount of extra costs incurred by
defendant as a result of plaintiff's failure to correct an answer to an interrogatory. See id.
at 173-74; supra note 91.
In United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local No. 115 v. Armour and Co., 106
F.R.D. 345, 350 (N.D. Cal. 1985) the court reduced a sanction award because defend-
ant's attorney failed to mitigate. The court ordered that the attorney, and not the client,
would be billed for the excess costs, and ordered the attorney to circulate the court's
opinion to the members of his firm. See id. at 346-47.
Among the factors that courts have considered in determining the proper sanction is
the sanctioned party's ability to pay. See Brown v. Federation of State Medical Bds., 830
F.2d 1429, 1439 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1281 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1185 (9th Cir.),
modified, 803 F.2d 1085 (1986). Thus, Rule 11 allows for a de minimus sanction rather
than allowing the party's ability to pay dictate whether the Rule has been violated.
131. E.g., compare 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (court may award a reasonable attorney's
fee to the prevailing party) with Fed R. Civ. P. 11 (authorizes "an appropriate sanction").
132. For example, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) to
motivate plaintiffs in certain certain civil rights actions to bring their claims to court,
thereby encouraging enforcement of the law. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 416, 418 (1978); Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759,
763-64 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981).
133. See supra note 132; Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 10, at 305 n.36.
134. See Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987).
135. See cases cited supra note 62. In the Fifth Circuit's decision in Thomas v. Capital
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more effective tool for curbing litigation abuses. Rule 11 allows for flexi-
ble sanctions, is applicable to clients as well as attorneys, and can be used
to protect the court system from negligent, in addition to vexatious, con-
duct.'3 6 In order to bring about the prompt withdrawal of meritless
claims, the most effective mechanism must be made available to the
courts.
III. RULE 11 SHOULD BE AMENDED TO IMPOSE ON ATTORNEYS A
CONTINUING OBLIGATION TO MONITOR THE VALIDITY OF
A CLAIM ONCE IT HAS BEEN FILED
A few lower courts have held that the current version of Rule 11 cre-
ates a duty to withdraw or amend baseless pleadings.' 37 All of the fed-
eral courts of appeals that have ruled on the issue, however, have held
that Rule 11 does not impose a continuing obligation.138 These courts
correctly argue that the plain language of the Rule does not include a
continuing duty; they also rely on the advisory committee note, which
they interpret to prohibit imposition of a continuing obligation, and the
adequacy of alternative sanctioning mechanisms to govern attorney con-
duct.139 Imposition of a continuing duty, however, is consistent with
Rule 11's underlying objectives. 4° Moreover, the advisory committee
note and the ethical standards of the legal profession support imposition
of a continuing duty.1 41 As demonstrated above, mechanisms suggested
as alternatives to imposing a continuing duty under Rule 11 lack the
Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc), the court held that the
"district court should utilize the sanction that furthers the purposes of Rule 11 and is the
least severe sanction adequate to such purpose." Id. Ironically, in further holding that
Rule 11 does not contain a continuing duty, the court precluded itself from using the
more flexible Rule 11 to accomplish the goal of imposing the least severe sanction in
continuing violation cases. See id.
136. Negligent conduct also can trigger Rule 11. See supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
137. See Lee v. Criterion Ins. Co., 659 F. Supp. 813, 821-22 (S.D. Ga. 1987); Jackson-
Colley v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 655 F. Supp. 122, 135-36 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Whitting-
ton v. Ohio River Co., 115 F.R.D. 201, 208 (E.D. Ky. 1987); Chang v. Meese, 660 F.
Supp. 782, 785 (D.P.R. 1987) (dictum); see also Basch v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 777
F.2d 165, 174 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring attorney to correct misleading information in a
pleading), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986); Advo System, Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D.
426, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (imposing duty to refrain from continuing meritless litiga-
tion); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn.
1984) (imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule I I and 28 U.S.C. § 1927); Brownlow v. Gen-
eral Servs. Employees Union, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,886, at 35,898 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (sanctioning continuation of meritless claim under Rule 11, noting that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1927 provides additional sanctioning authority).
138. See cases cited supra note 62.
139. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987); Pantry Queen
Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987); Oliveri v.
Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1272-74 (2d Cir. 1986), cerL denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987).
140. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
141. See infra notes 156-60, 169-77 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 96-136 and accompanying text.
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scope and flexibility of the amended Rule. 143 Because the courts largely
have rejected a continuing duty under the current version of Rule 11, an
amendment to the Rule is needed to give the courts a tool adequate to
sanction postfiling abuses in the federal courts. 144
A. A Continuing Obligation Comports with the Purposes of Rule 11
In refusing to impose a continuing obligation under Rule 11, courts
have cited the absence from the Rule of an express duty to update plead-
ings or to withdraw baseless claims. 145 The language of Rule 11 states
only that it applies to the signing of a paper 146 and makes no mention of
an obligation to withdraw a baseless pleading. Thus, according to most
courts, the Rule does not contain an obligation to prevent continuation
of baseless claims once a pleading has been signed and filed after a rea-
sonable inquiry.'47
Imposing a continuing obligation under Rule 11 to require attorneys to
update pleadings, rather than to allow court proceedings to continue un-
til the time when a party must file its next paper, however, comports with
143. See supra notes 41, 48, 130 and accompanying text.
144. See Parness, supra note 7, at 337-38; Risinger, supra note 7, at 59 n.187.
145. See supra note 11.
146. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The rule bears the title "Signing of Pleadings, Motions,
and Other Papers; Sanctions" and requires that each pleading, motion, or other paper be
signed. It further provides that the signature constitutes the attorney's certification that
he has read the pleading and that the pleading is well grounded both in fact and law and
not interposed for any improper purpose. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987).
It has also been suggested, however, that "[t]he purpose of the signature is to allow a
court to easily identify the person or people upon whom it can place responsibility for a
particular document." Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1128
(5th Cir. 1987), overruled, Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc); accord Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir.
1986). In addition, some courts have forgone the signature requirement and imposed
sanctions on nonsigners, further demonstrating that the signing requirement is not an
absolute necessity to trigger liability under Rule 11. See Alcan Aluminum Corp. v.
Lyntel Products, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1138, 1140 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Calloway v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 650 F. Supp. 684, 686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Itel Containers Int'l
Corp. v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 96, 102-03 (D.N.J. 1985).
Therefore, this focus on signing perhaps has been misplaced.
147. See cases cited supra note 62. It also has been argued that if the drafters of
amended Rule 11 intended to extend the Rule to include a continuing obligation, they
could have done so in 1983. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987). Because Rule 11 applies to all papers filed in
the litigation, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.; Letter From Mansfield, supra note 35, at 191, courts
that oppose finding a continuing duty under the Rule have asserted that reading the Rule
to require an additional postfiling duty is unnecessary. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs.,
Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz
Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987); Levin & Sobel, supra note 7, at 605.
It also has been asserted, however, that Rule 1l's application to all filings creates an
implicit obligation to keep the court apprised of any material changes in the case. See
Advo System, Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
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the goals of the Rule 48-- including increased judicial efficiency and de-
creased litigation expense. 4 9 Thus, an amendment to the Rule expressly
imposing such an obligation would promote the policies underlying the
Rule.
The advisory committee note 5 ' to amended Rule 11 emphasizes that
judges are to avoid post hoc judgments as to the viability of a claim in
handing out sanctions.' 5 ' Because the advisory committee note instructs
courts to assess the reasonableness of a pleading by examining facts
known at the time of filing,' 52 it has been cited extensively to deny use of
Rule 11 as a monitor of postfiling conduct.' 53 Requiring an attorney to
respond in a reasonable manner at the time new facts are presented to
him, however, would satisfy the advisory committee note. Such a re-
quirement still would avoid post hoc judgements by evaluating the attor-
ney's conduct at the time he learned of the information giving rise to a
duty to amend or withdraw the pleading. 54 An attorney should not be
allowed to avoid responsibility for the merit of a pending claim simply
because it complied with Rule 11 when filed.' 55
148. See Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 456-
57 (7th Cir. 1987) (Ripple, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
150. The advisory committee notes are considered highly persuasive. See 2 J. Moore,
Moore's Federal Practice 1.13 [2] (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988). The Supreme Court has
stated that the notes are of weight on the issue of construction. See Mississippi Publish-
ing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); J. Moore, supra.
151. The advisory committee's note states that "[t]he court is expected to avoid using
the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring what was rea-
sonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.LD. 165, 199 (1983). See
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 484 (3d Cir. 1987); Hurd v. Ralph's Grocery Co.,
824 F.2d 806, 810-11 (9th Cir 1987).
152. See Fed. R. Civ. P. I1 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199
(1983).
153. See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874-75 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1373 (1987).
154. See Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 457
(7th Cir. 1987) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Courts have inter-
preted the advisory committee's note to prohibit making post hoc judgments as to the
viability of a claim, without holding that the advisory committee intended to bar imposi-
tion of a continuing duty. See Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119,
1131 (5th Cir. 1987) (imposing a continuing duty), overruled, Thomas v. Capital Sec.
Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536-37 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the advisory commit-
tee's note but not discussing a continuing duty); infra note 155. The advisory committee
note merely prohibits the court from acting as a "Monday morning quarterback" in im-
posing sanctions. See Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
155. See Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 200. Judge Schwarzer suggests that:
While hindsight must be rejected as a sword, it also provides no shield. A posi-
tion that might be reasonable in a paper filed early in the action may become
unreasonable or frivolous in the light of subsequent discovery. The relevant
state of facts, knowledge and belief will therefore change during the course of
the litigation and papers must be assessed accordingly.
Id. (citing Steinberg v. St. Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421, 425 (S.D.N.Y.
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The advisory committee note to the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 also
states that Rule 11 is intended for use in circumstances similar to those
that courts address by use of their inherent power.15 6 The note provides
that amended Rule 11 is designed to curb abuses in litigation "by build-
ing upon and expanding" courts' inherent power.1 5 7 The inherent power
doctrine requires parties and attorneys to refrain from dilatory litigation
practices throughout the course of the litigation"' and can be used to
impose sanctions for continuing an action in bad faith. 159 Because the
inherent power doctrine indirectly imposes a continuing obligation, the
advisory committee's reference to it indicates the scope of litigation
abuses subject to amended Rule 11. " Thus, an amendment to Rule 11
should expressly state that the Rule can be used for more than merely
examining the validity of a claim at the time a paper is signed and filed.
Amending Rule 11 to include a duty to withdraw or amend baseless
pleadings also comports with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I ("Rule
1"), which provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." 161 The objectives of the Federal Rules in general, as ex-
pressed in Rule 1, strongly resembles the policy goals of the 1983 amend-
1984)). The court in Steinberg held that sanctions under § 706(k) of Title VII and the
inherent power were warranted because "[e]ven if the plaintiffs' counsel was unaware at
the commencement of suit that both claims were insupportable, he should have quickly
realized this fact as discovery progressed.... Nevertheless, the plaintiffs and their coun-
sel went all the way to trial on the claims." 583 F. Supp. at 425. Judge Schwarzer is a
recognized authority on amended Rule 11. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 584 (9th Cir. 1987) (dissent from denial of en banc rehear-
ing); In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 498 & n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
156. The advisory committee's note states that "[t]he amended rule attempts to deal
with the problem [of Rule 1 l's ineffectiveness] by building upon and expanding the equi-
table doctrine permitting the court to award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a liti-
gant whose opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) (emphasis
added).
157. Id.
158. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766-67 & n.13 (1980); Link v.
Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-33 (1962); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539
(1925).
159. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 766; Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973).
160. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir.
1985), modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 121, cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 269 (1987); Callo-
way v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 650 F. Supp. 684, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re
Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 495 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see also Burbank, supra note 35, at
1106 (questioning whether the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court can expand in-
herent power as dramatically as the 1983 amendments to Rule I 1 do).
161. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. See Doyle v. United States, 817 F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 159 (1987). Courts frequently have looked to Rule 1 in construing
other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
327 (1986) (using Rule I to arrive at standard for summary judgment pursuant to Rule
56); Trentacosta v. Frontier Pac. Aircraft Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 1561-62 (9th Cir. 1987)
(allowing amendment to complaint pursuant to Rule 15 as consistent with Rule 1); Car-
teret Say. & Loan Ass'n, F.A. v. Jackson, 812 F.2d 36, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim barred the claim in accordance with Rule 1);
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ments.162 As a result, imposing a continuing duty comports with the
spirit of Rule 1, as well as that of Rule 11. For example, imposing such a
duty will require parties to eliminate claims that pretrial discovery shows
to be meritless,163 and thus fulfills the Rules' goal of "streamlining" liti-
gation." A continuing duty prevents continuation of a claim in order to
pressure an opponent into a settlement,1 61 giving effect to the Rules' gen-
eral interest in expeditious resolution as expressed in Rule 1, as well as to
amended Rule 1 l's expansion to abuses other than delay. 166 Last, Rule
11, consistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules as expressed in Rule 1,
was intended to cut back on the costs of frivolous litigation. 67 Imposi-
tion of a continuing obligation would further this objective as well, be-
cause litigation that becomes frivolous proves just as costly to the system
as the filing of a claim that was frivolous at its inception.
68
see also 2 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 1.13 [1] (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1988)
(illustrating courts' use of Rule 1 to construe other federal rules).
In UNR Indus., Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 623 F. Supp. 1319 (N.D. Inl. 1985), the
court noted that delay in amending a pleading pursuant to Rule 15 contradicts Rule 1
because a party who so delays is "holding back and only playing his cards when necessary
to avoid defeat." Id. at 1325. A failure to withdraw a claim that becomes meritless
contravenes Rule 1 in the same way.
Rules that parallel Rules 1 and 11 in attempting to prevent waste of judicial resources
are found throughout the statutes and rules of civil and appellate procedure. See Road-
way Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980); Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d
1504, 1510 (1987). For example, Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
authorizes federal courts of appeals to award just damages and single or double costs
upon determining that an appeal is frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 38. In addition,
Supreme Court Rule 49.2 prohibits frivolous appeal or frivolous petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 49.2; Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S.
1067, 1072 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
162. Compare Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (Rule I expresses
purpose of Federal Rules as a whole) and Brennan v. O'Donnell, 426 F.2d 218, 221 (5th
Cir. 1970) (Rule 1 demonstrates purpose of Federal Rules: "to expedite the just disposi-
tion of cases and reduce the costs of litigation") with Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551,
1556 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Rule I1 designed to avoid unnecessary delay and ex-
pense in litigation) and Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531,
1536 (9th Cir. 1986) (major purpose of Rule 11 is to streamline litigation).
163. See Advo System, Inc. v. Walters, 110 F.R.D. 426, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1986);
Nelken, supra note 7, at 1331; Pamess, supra note 7, at 341; Schwarzer, supra note 7, at
200; Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 10, at 326.
164. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983); Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 457 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Parness, supra note 7, at
337-39.
165. See Nelken, supra note 7, at 1331.
166. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Eliminating meritless claims from court dockets will re-
duce defense expenditures and use of court time, in accordance with the policies underly-
ing Rule 11. See Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451,
456 (7th Cir. 1987) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Wig-
gins Remarks, supra note 28, at 178 (improper purposes other than delay are covered by
the amended rule).
167. See supra note 162.
168. See Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Pantry
Queen Foods, 809 F.2d at 456-57 (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Parness, supra note 7, at 338; Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 10, at 326.
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B. Ethical Aspect of Rule 11
The duty to investigate claims and to avoid pursuing frivolous litiga-
tion is imposed not only by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but also
by the ethical rules of the legal profession.1 69 That the new language of
169. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(1)-(2) (1983); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 3.1, 3.2 (1983); Webb v. County Board of Educ.,
471 U.S. 234, 250 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re
Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Glover v. Libman, 578 F. Supp. 748,
769 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
The various codes of professional responsibility and conduct were promulgated by the
American Bar Association and operate as guidelines for state and local bar associations.
F. Marks & D. Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession in Ethics and the Legal
Profession 62, 65 (M. Davis & F. Elliston ed. 1986). The state and local bar associations,
legislatures and courts have for the most part enacted these guidelines, id., and discipli-
nary procedures typically are conducted by the state and local bar. Id. at 72.
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(2) (1983), which provided the
phraseology for Model Rule 3.1 and Rule 11, provides that "a lawyer shall not . . .
[k]nowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except
that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument
for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." Id. That rule is comple-
mented by DR 7-102(A)(1), which provides that a lawyer shall not "[flile a suit, assert a
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when
he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or mali-
ciously injure another." Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(1)
(1983).
The adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct by the American Bar Asso-
ciation took place nearly simultaneously with the 1983 amendments to Rule 11. See
Schwarzer, supra note 7, at 189-90 (Model Rules that parallel Rule 11 adopted in 1983).
The Model Rules add an additional burden on an attorney to expedite litigation. See
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.2 (1983) ("A lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client."). The comment to
Model Rule 3.2 indicates the scope of this duty:
Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Delay
should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the advocates, or for the
purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or
repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the
bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good
faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose
other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper
delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.2 comment (1983).
Model Rule 3.1 addresses the same goals as does Rule 11. Compare ABA Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (1983) ("[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding,
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal
of existing law") with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 ("The signature of an attorney ... constitutes a
certificate by the signer that ... [the pleading] is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law .... ). Under the Model Rules, an action is frivolous
if the client desires to have the action taken primarily for the purpose of harass-
ing or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable either to make a
good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action
taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 comment (1983).
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Rule 11 adopted in the 1983 amendments parallels the language used in
its ethical rules counterpart17° evidences the intention of the drafters of
the current Rule to reinforce a commitment to legal ethics.'
These ethical rules resemble Rule 11 in that they are designed to help
conserve judicial resources. 17 2 Yet they also attempt to balance the de-
sire for efficiency against the duties of loyalty to the client and zealous
advocacy.173 A client's right to zealous representation, however, does
not require courts to tolerate the continuation of baseless claims. 74
Thus, to prohibit continuation of meritless claims is consistent with an
attorney's pledge to represent his client zealously within the bounds of
the law.
A lawyer's responsibility under the combined guidance of the various
rules of professional conduct may involve advising a client to forego a
claim or theory of recovery that technically may go forward but practi-
170. As one court observed:
[I]t is not a coincidence that the newly-inserted language in Rule 11 ... mirrors
the standards in ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(2) and
in ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 and its accompanying
comment. All of them-Rule 11, the DR and the Model Rule-teach that a
lawyer's duty to his or her client cannot be permitted to override his or her duty
to the justice system, defined by all three of those rules.
In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 497 (N.D. Ill. 1985). See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp.
v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1987) (dissent from denial of en banc
rehearing); Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(2) (1983); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (1983); Dynamics of Rule 11, supra note 10, at
316; see also Glover v. Libman, 578 F. Supp. 748, 769 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (DR 7-102(A)(2)
supports Rule 11).
171. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir.
1987) (dissent from denial en banc rehearing); In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 497
(N.D. Ill. 1985); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (D.N.J. 1983); see also
Levy v. Seaton, 358 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (discussing ethical component of prior
Rule 11).
172. Breach of the ethical and legal duty encompassed by the ethical Rules and by
Rule 11 "evidences disdain for the public, whose claims lie dormant because frivolous
suits have diverted away scarce judicial resources, disdain for adversaries, who must ex-
pend time and money to defend against meritless attacks, and disdain for clients, whose
trust is rewarded with legal bills, dismissals, and court-imposed sanctions." Lepucki v.
Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985).
173. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1983) ("A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law"); DR 7-101-02
(1983); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. I 1 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165,
199 (1983) (Rule 11 is "not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity").
174. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir.
1987) (dissent from denial of en banc rehearing). Analogizing to Nix V. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157 (1986), which held that a client has no right to present false testimony at trial,
the Golden Eagle dissenting opinion noted that "a restraint on the freedom of a lawyer to
present falsity as truth does not create any true conflict." Golden Eagle, 809 F.2d at 589.
Although the panel opinion in Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801
F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), held that Rule 11 does not require courts to enforce ethical
standards, that case dealt with an asserted duty under Rule 11 to disclose adverse author-
ity to the court. See id. at 1542.
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cally or ethically should not.175 Ultimately, the ethical standards collec-
tively imposed on attorneys require an attorney to withdraw a claim
when he learns that it lacks merit.17 6 Because Rule 11 was drafted, in
part, as a necessary reinforcment of this ethical standard,'77 Rule 11
should be amended to expressly require withdrawal of a baseless claim.
Cases rejecting an implied continuing duty under Rule 11, based on a
finding that the plain language of Rule 11 does not include a duty ex-
tending beyond the time a pleading is signed, necessarily ignore the im-
portant policy arguments favoring imposition of such a duty set forth
above. 178 Because courts have been reluctant to adopt a continuing duty
not expressly contained within the Rule, 179 amending Rule 11 to ex-
pressly include a continuing duty to withdraw a baseless claim offers the
best solution to the problem of unreasonably continued litigation.
CONCLUSION
In order for the goals of Rule 11 to be realized, attorneys and parties
should be required to update pleadings filed with the court upon discov-
ery that the underlying facts are materially different from what they had
supposed or that a change in the law has materially affected the merits of
their claim. Under such a system, lawsuits that become meritless after
the filing of pleadings would be dismissed immediately.
The drafters of Rule 11 and its amendments were concerned with
175. See Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 519 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (a claim
which could survive a motion to dismiss may still violate the ethical rules).
176. It could be argued that under the ethical rules if an attorney discovers after filing
suit that his client in fact does not have a case, his withdrawl is permissive and not
mandatory. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-110(C) (1983); Cann,
Frivolous Lawsuits-The Lawyer's Duty To Say "No", 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 367, 377
(1981); cf. Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 601 (La. App. 1976) (applies similar
Louisiana statute). However, Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B) and Model Rule 1.16(a)(l)
mandate withdrawal when the attorney knows that his continued employment will result
in violation of a disciplinary rule. Because Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2) and Model
Rule 3.1 prohibit lawyers from advancing a claim unwarranted under existing law, with-
drawal should be mandatory. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-
110(B), 7-102(A)(2) (1983); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(a)(1), 3.1
(1983); Cann, supra, at 377 & n.51.
177. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Although the ethical rules provide
guidance for attorney conduct, they alone are insufficient to deter continuing violations
for two reasons. First, because the stigma attached to a disciplinary sanction is severe,
courts discipline attorneys for ethical violations with great reluctance. See Brown v. Fed-
eration of State Medical Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1437 (7th Cir. 1987); Golden Eagle Distrib.
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th Cir. 1986). The former version of
Rule 11, which proved ineffective, relied on disciplinary action to deter willful violations.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. 540, 540-41 (1982); supra note 22. Second, Rule 11
recognizes that it is the trial court that is most familiar with the conduct of persons
appearing before it and is best suited to determine if, and what, sanctions should be im-
posed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200
(1983); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
178. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
179. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
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curbing defense costs imposed on parties by meritless claims and with
halting the waste of judicial resources in handling such claims. Imposing
a continuing obligation on litigants and their attorneys furthers the goals
of Rule 11 by halting defense costs and the use of court resources as soon
as possible.
Unfortunately, the drafters of the 1983 amendments did not provide
expressly that Rule 11 creates a duty to update pleadings or to withdraw
baseless claims. Adherence to the letter of the law has made courts re-
luctant to interpret Rule 11 to include a continuing duty. Case law since
the 1983 amendments suggests, however, that courts are finding a need to
monitor postfiling conduct. Rather than imposing sanctions by forcing a
square peg into a round hole, an amendment to Rule 11 requiring liti-
gants to update pleadings and withdraw baseless claims is needed. Such
an amendment would clarify the standards governing postfiling conduct
and would further Rule 1 I's goal of ensuring efficient and ethical litiga-
tion practice in the federal courts.
Julia K. Cowles

